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DO THEY MARCH TO THE SAME DRUMMER?
Introduction
Do cooperatives and investor owned firms march to  the  same drummer?
In a survey performed by Purdue University  in the  late 1970's and early
1980's  (Schrader et  al.),  policy makers and university economists  felt
there were  significant differences between the  goals  of cooperatives and
investor owned firms  (IOFs),  while the  "managers of cooperatives  and
proprietary firms ranked goals of their firms essentially the same"  (Babb
and Lang, p. 12).
Perhaps  the difference in opinion is  due to  the general absence of
widely accepted criteria by which to measure the performance of
cooperatives.  Schrader  et al. have argued that both critics  and defenders
of cooperatives have suffered from a lack of objective measures of
cooperative performance.  This  lack of accepted performance measures may
be caused by disagreements over the role or function of cooperatives in
society.  In addition to  their business activity,  cooperatives  also
provide goods and services  for which no market values are  available,  and
conventional economic  analysis, based on financial performance measures,
usually fails  to  capture the nonmarket dimensions of cooperatives.
Complete  evaluation of cooperative performance requires  consideration of
these nonmarket dimensions.  This paper argues  that while some aspects  of
cooperative performance may be evaluated in comparison to  investor owned
firms,  the nonmarket aspects  of cooperatives  should also be included in
the evaluation of cooperative performance.The next two sections review alternative  schools of  thought about
agricultural cooperatives and provide a preliminary comparison of dairy
cooperatives and investor owned firms  over the period from 1973  to  1987
using a number of standard financial ratios.  Nonmarket dimensions of
cooperative performance  are then identified along with some methods  that
could be applied to  their evaluation.  The  final  section contains
concluding remarks.
Economic Models of Cooperative Behavior
One  school of thought views  cooperatives as  a variant of an investor
owned firm.  Cooperatives are  viewed as  organizations having scope  for
decision making independent of  farmer-members and are modeled as  investor
owned firms,  but with a different objective  function.  For example,  an
appropriate objective function of a cooperative,  as  originally suggested
by Enke,  may be  to maximize the sum of producer surplus  (profits)  and
consumer surplus  (lower prices)  rather than return on members'  investment
in the cooperative.L
A second school of thought views  cooperatives  as  a form of collective
action in which individuals join together to  accomplish what would be more
costly or impossible  to  achieve individually (Zusman).  Farmers and other
small  operators can use collective action to  ameliorate  their potential
disadvantage in the market system.  With this  definition of a cooperative,
an appropriate measure  of agricultural cooperative performance could be
the profitability of the members'  farming operations with and without  the
cooperative.
1 Cooperatives also have been modeled as maximizing  average per unit
surplus or price received by members  (see Helmberger and Hoos).
2Cooperative Performance Evaluation:  Comparison To  Investor Owned Firms
If cooperatives  are viewed as  a variant of  investor owned firms,
then it  is  appropriate to compare  cooperatives and IOFs using standard
techniques  of financial performance evaluation, such as  financial  ratio
analysis.  Four financial ratios  measuring profitability, leverage,
solvency,  and liquidity were selected for comparison in  this study.  The
financial ratios of cooperatives were calculated using financial
statements  collected from 10 of  the  largest U.S.  dairy cooperatives  for
the period 1973  to  1987.  The comparable  ratios for IOFs were obtained
from the Dairy Product Manufacturers category  as  reported in Robert Morris
Associates Annual Statements  Studies  (RMA).  The number of IOFs  in the RMA
studies  for the corresponding years varied from  82  to  158  for most ratios.
The  dairy sector was used because of the  relative comparability of IOFs
and the cooperatives with respect to  the scope of operations.2  Both dairy
cooperatives and investor owned dairy establishments produce creamery
butter;  natural and processed cheese;  dry,  condensed and evaporated milk;
ice  cream;  and specialty dairy products.
For the  financial performance comparisons,  the median financial  ratio
of the dairy cooperatives was compared to  the  top and bottom quartile
rankings  of the  same  financial ratio for IOFs. 3 The RMA top  (bottom)
2 The availability of financial statements  and the  relative  compara-
bility of asset size were also  factors  in  selecting dairy cooperatives  as
the basis  for comparison.  Although  financial data were available for a
number of farm supply cooperatives, the RMA financial data base did not
include farm supply IOFs prior to  1988.  Financial data were also
available for a number of grain marketing cooperatives, but their asset
size was significantly larger than the RMA-listed  investor owned grain
marketing firms.
3 Medians were selected as  the basis  for comparison because  this,  and
the  two quartiles,  are  the only statistics published by RMA for  investor
owned firms.  Solvency ratios were not published by RMA prior to  1977.
3quartile ranking is  such that  the ratios  for 25%  of the  listed firms are
better  (worse) than the quartile value.  The  time-series comparisons of
cooperatives and IOFs  for each of  the selected ratios are presented in
graphical  form.  The detailed values of  the ratios and the number of
observations are  given in the Appendix tables.
Profitability
In  this  study, profitability was measured by the ratio of profits
before taxes  to  net worth4 . This ratio  is reported as  a percentage and
expresses the before-tax rate of return on equity capital.5 A low rate of
return, normally  indicating inefficient management,  could reflect a
conservatively financed, low-debt firm,  or alternatively the pursuit of
goals other than maximizing the  rate of return on equity.  The
profitability measure was selected with the expectation that  it  could
reveal a difference between IOFs and cooperatives,  given that the primary
goal of cooperatives may not be maximizing return on  investment.
As  illustrated in Figure  1, the median profitability ratio  for
cooperatives has declined over  the years but still lies  within the middle
50%  of  the  IOFs.  There  is  no  strong evidence to  support  the claim that
cooperatives are less  profitable than the  IOFs.  Although their objective
may not be to maximize return on equity,  these results  indicate that  dairy
cooperatives  in fact perform similarly to  dairy IOFs with respect to
return on equity.
4 The net worth of  the dairy cooperatives is  the  total equity as
reported in their financial  statements.
5 RMA reports only the before-tax rate of return to  equity for IOFs.
This measure may be justified  for  the purposes  of the  present comparison
because of possible differences  in tax treatment among firms.
4Figure 1.  Ratio of Net Profit Before Taxes  to Net Worth
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5Leverage
Leverage is  a measure of outside financing that  the firm raises  in
addition to  owners'  equity capital.  In this  study,  leverage was  defined
as the ratio  of total liabilities  to net worth and indicates  the  level of
protection provided to  creditors.  The higher the  leverage ratio,  the
greater the risk assumed by the creditors due  to  the probability of
default by the  firm,  while a lower ratio generally indicates greater
financial  security for  the creditors.
While IOFs  are free  to  raise equity capital by issuing stock,  equity
formation in cooperatives  is normally restricted to retained earnings.  As
a result,  cooperatives are regarded as  equity-bound and are  forced to  rely
on debt  for a larger portion of  their financing needs.  Accordingly,
higher leverage ratios may be expected for cooperatives  than for  IOFs.
Contrary to  this  expectation,  the median leverage ratio of  the dairy
cooperatives, as  shown in Figure 2, has been within the middle 50%  of the
leverage  ratio for  IOFs.  In fact,  the leverage of the dairy cooperatives
has  improved over the  years,  declining from the bottom quartile of the
IOFs  to  the  top  quartile.  Dairy cooperatives  thus  compare very favorably
to dairy IOFs with respect  to  their debt levels.
Solvency
Solvency measures a firm's  capacity  to  service debt.  In  this  study,
following RMA, solvency was measured by the ratio  of net profit plus
depreciation to  the current portion of long term debt.  This  ratio
expresses  the coverage of current maturities by cash flows  from
operations.  Because cash flow  is  the primary source of debt retirement,
6Figure 2.  Ratio of Total Liabilities to Net Worth for Cooperatives
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7this  ratio measures the ability of  the firm to  service principal repayment
and  is an indicator of  its debt capacity.
Several  of the cooperatives  in the study had little or no  long term
debt.  With fewer solvency ratio observations,  ranging in number from six
to  eight  over the years,  the cooperative median value as  shown in Figure  3
was relatively volatile.  For  the  firms  that did have  long term debt, the
median coverage  ratio  for cooperatives has been higher  than the coverage
ratio  for 75%  of IOF dairies  in half of the years  reported and in all
years  the cooperative median has been above the  IOF median.  The
comparison provides evidence  that in  general cooperatives are at  least as
able as  IOFs  to make principal repayments.
Liquidity
Liquidity  is a measure of the  adequacy of current assets to  meet
current obligations.  For this  study,  liquidity was measured by the  "quick
ratio,"  the ratio of cash plus  receivables to  current  liabilities.  A
value less  than one implies a dependency on inventory or other current
assets to  liquidate short term obligations.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the median dairy cooperative has
consistently had a quick ratio near 1, indicating a comfortable  liquidity
position for the  top half of the  dairy cooperatives.  Over  the past 15
years the median quick ratio of the dairy cooperatives has consistently
been near the  top quartile  of the  IOF dairy enterprises.
8Figure 3.  Ratio of Net Profit to Current Portion of Long Term
Debt for Cooperatives and Investor Owned Firms
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10Summary
The comparisons  in Figures  1-4 indicate  that there  is not much
difference between the performance of dairy cooperatives and IOFs as
measured by these four  financial ratios  over a 15-year period.  These
findings  are similar  to what Schrader et  al.  found in  their comparison of
"small" cooperatives and IOFs,  using cross-sectional rather than time-
series data.  In contrast,  for "large"  cooperatives and IOFs,  Chen
observed substantial differences  in leverage and profitability.  As
hypothesized in this  study,  Chen found leverage to be higher for
cooperatives and return on net worth to be lower.  However,  Chen used a
diversified sample of 79  large agribusiness  firms  in five different
industry groups.  The difference  in findings between this  study and Chen
may be attributable  to  either industry or size effects.  The cooperative
firms used in this  study,  while definitely large,  were all  from the  dairy
industry.  The  dairy IOFs,  on the other hand, were a mix of asset sizes,
as  reported in RMA.  More detailed analysis may reveal that comparative
performance varies across industry and size category.
Alternative  Performance Criteria for Cooperatives
Cooperatives and IOFs  are generally viewed as  different in a number
of nonfinancial dimensions  and performance evaluation of cooperatives
should not be limited to  financial comparisons with  IOFs.
Cooperatives,  in particular,  are often thought of as  providing a
public good.  One  of the  roles  that cooperatives might play,  as  suggested
by Nourse,  is  that of competitive yardstick:  cooperatives  should add
enough competition to  the system  to give  farmers a basis upon which to
11judge the  terms  offered by  investor-owned firms.  Staatz  (p. 97)  notes
that:
Farmers,  faced with unsatisfactory performance by IOFs,  may form
a cooperative firm whose purpose  is  to  force  the  IOFs,  through
competition, to  improve their service  to  farmers.  If successful
in enforcing competition, the cooperative  generates benefits
that  it does not capture  itself but which accrue to  the farmer-
stockholders,  as well as  to other  farmers  in  the  area.
Another public good aspect of cooperatives  is  their ability to
correct  for market  failures by providing services  for which a functioning
market does not exist.  Additional nonmarket dimensions  of cooperatives
include education in democratic control,  leadership training, and
experience in political activity.
For some nonmarket dimensions of cooperatives it may be possible to
estimate a value,  which can be used to  judge cooperative performance.
Evaluation of nonmarket goods has received a great deal  of consideration
in the area of environmental and resource economics,  where two general
approaches  of evaluating nonmarket goods  are:  (1) inferring values from
observed behavior, and (2) direct elicitation.  Both approaches may lead
to  alterative techniques  for evaluation of  cooperative performance.
As  indicated previously, cooperatives  can be viewed as  a form of
collective action.  Cooperative performance can therefore be measured by
estimating the incremental value of cooperative  organization to  the
members.  As  suggested by approach  (1)  above,  the incremental value of
cooperatives can be inferred by measuring differences  in the observed
prices between cooperatives and IOFs.  For  example,  the value  of a marketing
cooperative can be  inferred from  the differences  in  the  prices received by
member producers from their cooperative  and those received by producers
dealing with comparable IOFs.  This  approach is  conceptually similar to
12hedonic pricing,  a technique which values attributes that are not traded
separately.  Hedonic pricing has been used to  infer the value of such
nonmarket goods as  airport noise and air pollution from the differences  in
housing prices over spatially separated markets  (Nelson and Brookshire et al.).
Selected attributes of cooperatives  can be valued by direct
elicitation approaches, which  include contingent valuation, contingent
ranking, and factorial survey methods6 . Each of these approaches involves
contacting a sample of individuals,  identifying for them a contingent or
hypothetical market and eliciting the value they attribute to  the
nonmarket good.  Contingent valuation elicits  the willingness of
individuals to  pay for an improvement or  to  accept a decrease  in the
quality or quantity of the nonmarket good.  Contingent ranking avoids  the
difficulty of asking individuals to  place a monetary value on a nonmarket
good by simply asking them to  rank the outcomes from most to  least
preferred.  Factorial survey or vignette analysis asks  individuals to  rank
bundles  of goods or vignettes,  rather than ranking single outcomes7 .
The observed price differences between cooperatives and IOFs make  it
possible  to  estimate the value of  the  total nonmarket services  of the
cooperative.  Directors,  managers  and members may be more  interested in
the valuation of specific  cooperative attributes,  which can be achieved by
the survey-based direct elicitation methods.  Application of these
techniques  to empirical evaluation of cooperatives  is  a subject  for future
research.
6 For contingent valuation methods,  see Cummings et al.  and Mitchell
and Carson.  For contingent ranking,  see Smith and Desvouges  (specifically,
Ch.  6).  Factorial survey methods are discussed in  Goodman.
7 Mitchell and Carson review the different biases inherent  in direct
elicitation methods  and provide suggestions of how to  minimize their
effects.  For a comparison of survey and hedonic approaches  to valuing
public goods,  see Brookshire et  al.
13Concluding Comments
There is  some evidence, based on the  Purdue University study
(Schrader et  al.)  and the preliminary financial ratio analysis  in this
study,  that cooperatives and IOFs  do march to  the  same drummer.  These
results lead one to  ask questions  such as:  Has  the  standard of financial
analysis  "forced" cooperatives  to  adopt the  same  goals  as  investor owned
firms?  Has  the emphasis  on efficiency and return in  the business
community had a determining influence on the behavior  of cooperatives?
Cooperatives,  however, have had and may continue  to have objectives which
differ from those of IOFs.  In order to capture  these objectives,  it may
be necessary to evaluate nonmarket aspects  of cooperative behavior.
In addition to  efficiency and financial performance,  Schrader et al.
examined some nonfinancial performance dimensions  of cooperatives.  They
considered performance perceptions of producers, managers,  policy makers,
and university economists  in such areas  as  degree of price  leadership,
price competitiveness, provisions of services,  and public responsibility.
They did not attempt  to estimate a value for  the nonmarket dimensions  of a
cooperative,  but rather obtained qualitative  information,  such as  whether
or not farmers perceived cooperatives  as providing better service  than
IOFs.  Some of the techniques  suggested in this  paper can be used to
assign values to  nonmarket attributes  of cooperatives.
The expanded evaluation of  the performance of cooperatives suggested
in this paper should be of  interest to cooperative members,  managers,
directors,  and government policy makers.  Through the use of nonmarket
valuation techniques,  it will be possible to elicit members'  preferences.
This  information can be used by the  members in evaluating the performance
14of  their cooperative, by managers  in setting plans  and strategies,  and by
directors  in evaluating the cooperative managers.  Government policy
makers can incorporate  the nonmarket evaluation results to assess  the
justification for  continued public support of cooperatives.
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